Regulated, Apparently
There is something reassuring about the word watchdog. It suggests alertness and independence. A creature stationed at the gate for the specific purpose of noticing when somebody climbs over it. Australia has quite a few watchdogs. This week, one of them is being asked who exactly, it has been watching.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is fronting a parliamentary inquiry into the KPMG audit leaks affair, after a whistleblower accused the regulator of having to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into investigating alleged misconduct at the firm. ASIC says it takes whistleblower reports seriously and has investigations under way. There is no public evidence of corruption or collusion. There are, however, some details worthy of a second look.
ASIC has continued buying services from KPMG while investigating KPMG-related conduct, eight active contracts, worth about $3 million, two of them begun after the preliminary investigation had already started. The people buying the services, ASIC notes, are separate from the people doing the investigating. This is the sort of sentence that makes this taxpayer stare thoughtfully at the ceiling.
Then there is the small matter of what ASIC can actually regulate. It oversees registered company auditors, not the sprawling multidisciplinary partnership those auditors happen to work inside. So we arrive at the first peculiarity of the Australian watchdog: it can watch the dog, it can watch the kennel, but whether it can watch the organisation who owns both is a question for the lawyers.
KPMG is not the only firm creating this sort of difficulty for its regulator. The Tax Practitioners Board investigated PwC after confidential government tax data turned up in the wrong hands, and a Senate inquiry later examined evidence of pressure applied to the TPB during that process. Now KPMG has handed the TPB its own awkward footnote: the board's current chair spent roughly 25 years at the firm, and eventually recused himself from its KPMG matter after concerns were raised about the association. Nothing improper established, just a regulator once again explaining why a relationship that looks uncomfortable is being properly managed.
Move away from accountancy and there is surprisingly little change. Telecommunications runs on a co-regulatory model in which the industry helps write the codes it will later be judged against, a system with a respectable logic, and an equally respectable resemblance to consulting the fox on the henhouse drawings. To its credit, ACMA rejected a proposed consumer-protection code last year as inadequate and is replacing it with something more enforceable. Less to its credit: when consumer group ACCAN raised concerns that Australians were struggling to reach Triple Zero during outages, ACMA responded by deploying its compulsory information-gathering powers on the ACCAN research. The telecommunications system spent the following year demonstrating, rather forcefully, why the concern had mattered.
Then there is food. Food regulation in Australia is rather wonderful because there isn't really a single food regulator. Standards are set federally, enforced by the states. The Department of Agriculture deals with imported food, and misleading claims belong to the ACCC. This arrangement works beautifully if you happen to be an organisational chart. It works considerably less well if you are holding a bottle of expensive olive oil and would simply like to know whether it contains expensive olive oil. An ABC Four Corners investigation into food fraud this year found the one thing nobody in this arrangement had: a regulator responsible for noticing when the whole supply chain is lying about what's actually in the bottle.
None of this requires anyone to be corrupt, captured or asleep. The ACCC's supermarket inquiry and pricing cases are proof enough that Australian regulators can have teeth when they choose to use them. What seems to be happening instead is considerably harder to legislate against: a regulator that spends decades around an industry comes to know it intimately, absorb its vocabulary, and eventually mistake familiarity for oversight. Executives know executives. Specialists become regulators, regulators become consultants, consultants advise government, government hires the firms back to explain the industry to the regulator. Somewhere in that loop, enforcement becomes engagement, a failure becomes a learning, and a breach becomes, an issue requiring a framework. Sir Humphrey would be proud. Whistleblowers tend to be troublesome in this environment.
ASIC may regulate the auditor but not the firm. The TPB may regulate the practitioner but recuse the chair. A professional body has its own rulebook, and Parliament wrote the boundaries that keep any one of them from seeing the whole shape of the thing. Eventually, when something sufficiently odorous happens, a parliamentary committee gathers to ask who was in charge, and everyone explains, entirely correctly, what their job was not.
It isn't necessary to believe the watchdogs are corrupt. It's only necessary to notice that a system can be full of conscientious people, each following their rules and declaring their conflicts, and still arrive at an outcome that looks remarkably like nobody being in charge at all.